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Recent decades have witnessed a global cascade of restrictive and repressive measures against nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). We theorize that state learning from observing the regional environment, rather than NGO growth per se or domes-
tic unrest, explains this rapid diffusion of restrictions. We develop and test two hypotheses: (1) states adopt NGO restrictions
in response to nonarmed bottom-up threats in their regional environment (“learning from threats”); (2) states adopt NGO
restrictions through imitation of the legislative behavior of other states in their regional environment (“learning from exam-
ples”). Using an original dataset on NGO restrictions in ninety-six countries over a period of twenty-five years (1992–2016), we
test these hypotheses by means of negative binomial regression and survival analyses, using spatially weighted techniques. We
find very limited evidence for learning from threats, but consistent evidence for learning from examples. We corroborate this
finding through close textual comparison of laws adopted in the Middle East and Africa, showing legal provisions being taken
over almost verbatim from one law into another. In our conclusion, we spell out the implications for the quality of democracy
and for theories of transition to a postliberal order, as well as for policy-makers, lawyers, and civil-society practitioners.
The NGO Restriction Cascade
The titles of reports by think tanks and civil-society watch-
dogs in the last half decade speak volumes. “Core Civil Soci-
ety Rights Violated in 109 Countries” is the headline launch-
ing a recent report by global civil-society alliance CIVICUS
(2016). A year earlier, president of the International Cen-
ter for Not-for-Profit Law Douglas Rutzen published an omi-
nously titled article “Civil Society Under Assault” (Rutzen
2015). And the year before that, the Carnegie Foundation
published its comprehensive report Closing Space: Democ-
racy and Human Rights Support Under Fire (Carothers and
Brechenmacher 2014). As we will show below, these reports
are not needlessly alarmist. Legislative restrictions against
NGOs have been on the rise globally since 1999, at an ever
steeper pace.
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What we mean by restrictions are legal measures in-
tended to hamper NGO work in general or to obstruct the
operations of specific NGOs at specific times. We refer to
such restrictions as “illiberal” because they impede freedom
of association and assembly, a classic liberal norm. Contrary
to our own initial expectations, the increase in restrictions
on NGOs has been associated with hybrid regimes, also
referred to as “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria 1997) as
much as with fully authoritarian regimes and to a lesser
extent also with full democracies. We suggest that the rise
in NGO restrictions is not just a belated response to NGO
growth since the 1990s. Instead, it is associated with a
broader trend of worldwide deterioration in the quality of
democracy, found in recent comparative research (see, for
instance, Luhrmann et al. 2018; Abramowitz and Repucci
2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
In our next section, we develop a theory on what drives
the diffusion of NGO restriction legislation. We build first
on existing studies on NGO restriction laws, subsequently on
studies of authoritarian learning, and finally on the liberal
norm diffusion literature. We posit that states adjust their
modes of governing potential threats from civil society by
learning from their regional environment. We propose two
hypotheses explaining how information from their environ-
ment may cause governments to overcome the barrier of
reputational risk and adopt NGO restrictions. The first as-
sumes that threats observed in the environment (i.e., insta-
bility) could lead to the adoption of restrictions on NGOs.
We call this “learning from threats.” The second hypothe-
sis relies on opportunities, not threats: observing the adop-
tion of NGO restrictions by others may inspire states to do
the same. We call this “learning from examples.” In both
cases, we assume learning to be geographically mediated:
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states learn primarily from developments in their regional
neighborhood.
Our third section introduces the quantitative panel
dataset we use to test the hypotheses. This dataset is
an amended and updated version of Christensen and
Weinstein (2013)’s database of legislative restrictions on
NGOs. Given the steep rise in restrictions already noted,
updating these data and modifying their structure has
intrinsic merit apart from our own theory of diffusion, as it
will enable further analyses by others.
In the next section we describe the methods and find-
ings of the quantitative analyses. Using negative binomial
regression and survival analysis with different types of spa-
tial weights, we find very little evidence for learning from
threats: the adoption of NGO restrictions does not con-
sistently follow bottom-up threats observed in the regional
environment. Conversely, we find systematic evidence for
learning from examples: prior adoption of NGO restrictions
by other states in the region does systematically and signifi-
cantly affect a state’s likelihood of adopting further restric-
tions. Moreover, the prior adoption of a specific type of re-
striction by other states also affects a state’s likelihood of sub-
sequent adoption of the same type of restriction.
Since regression analysis alone cannot give conclusive
proof of diffusion through learning, we corroborate and
elaborate on our findings regarding the learning-from-
examples hypothesis with qualitative evidence from the Mid-
dle East and sub-Saharan Africa in our penultimate section.
Through close textual comparisons, we provide “smoking
gun” evidence of learning from examples, tracing the migra-
tion of specific legal formulations of restrictions from one
state’s law to others in consecutive years.
We argue that what we are witnessing is a process of il-
liberal norm diffusion; while placing restrictions on NGOs
is attractive to most governments, especially less than fully
democratic ones, at all times, governments learn to what ex-
tent and in what form it has become legitimate to do so
from monitoring the adoption behavior of other states in
the region. Our descriptive statistics are in line with recent
literature on “democratic backsliding,” which has evidenced
an increase in restrictions on civil society alongside curtail-
ments of freedom of speech and of the media, erosion of the
independence of the judiciary, and manipulation of elec-
toral laws (Luhrmann et al. 2018; Abramowitz and Repucci
2018). But while comparative, this literature is domestically
oriented in its diagnosis. Our findings connect the trends
observed in this comparativist literature to the study of norm
diffusion in international relations, suggesting that govern-
ments may look to each other for guidance on whether or
how to restrict civil society, the media, the judiciary, or the
opposition.
The NGO restrictions cascade also relates to debates in
international relations on the putative transformation away
from a liberal world order: while such restrictions consti-
tute violations of freedom of association in and of them-
selves, they may also signify a weakening of global civil soci-
ety, which may have knock-on effects for other liberal norms.
Stephen (2014, 914) has argued that Brazil, Russia, India,
and China (the BRIC powers) are challenging the current
global governance system’s “most liberal principles.” Focus-
ing on China, Kupchan (2014, 255) has argued that “revi-
sion to the normative foundations of Pax Americana may
be needed” to accommodate its rise, particularly on norms
relating to “human rights, the rule of law, and represen-
tative government.” Jacob, Scherpereel, and Adams (2017)
have suggested that the rise of China, Russia, and India is al-
ready negatively affecting gender parity norms. Others such
as Ikenberry (2011), Goh (2013), or Tansey (2016) have
contested the idea that rising powers are interested in or
capable of undermining liberal institutions and norms. But
these critiques too assume that whether or not the world is
moving toward a more illiberal dispensation is determined
by the dispositions of a few great powers. Our data suggest
that there may indeed be an illiberal transformation under-
way, but that we should look well beyond the actions and
intentions of great powers to understand it.
Illiberal Norm Diffusion: Learning from Threats and
Learning from Examples
We situate our research in the literature on diffusion and
more specifically on learning as a mechanism of diffusion.
Having done so, we will discuss previous findings on NGO
restrictions, on authoritarian learning, and on liberal norm
diffusion. They all provide pieces to the puzzle of under-
standing the cascade of NGO restrictions, but none can pro-
vide the answer alone. Existing studies on NGO restrictions
explain how governments need to balance the risk of social
unrest against the reputational and potentially also finan-
cial risks of restricting NGOs, but they treat sources of un-
rest as purely domestic and international reputational costs
as given. The literature on authoritarian learning has shown
how authoritarian resilience requires adaptation not just to
changing domestic circumstances, but also to changes in the
regional environment. While it is only focused on threat-
handling by fully authoritarian states, its insights may have
broader implications. The norm diffusion literature pro-
vides valuable insights into how reputational costs may al-
ter as norms are diffused between states. But rooted as it
was in post–Cold war teleological understandings of global
progress toward liberal democracy, it focused only on rep-
utational advantages from the adoption of liberal norms
and never seriously studied apparent phenomena of illib-
eral norm diffusion. Using these three previous literatures
as building blocks, we explain our theory of illiberal norm
diffusion as applied to NGO restrictions, and we present our
hypotheses.
Diffusion, Common Shocks, and Learning
The trend in NGO restrictions is a manifestation of cluster-
ing: “nation-states . . . choose similar institutions within a
fairly circumscribed period of time” (Elkins and Simmons
2005). Clustering is easy to observe, especially when it comes
to legislation. Such clustering is the result of diffusion: the
process by which the “prior adoption of a trait or practice in
a population alters the probability of adoption for remain-
ing nonadopters” (Strang 1991, 325). The difficulty is to try
and discern what drives such a process, or in other words,
what it is that is altering the probability.
One obvious explanation for clustering, and a great con-
founder for our understanding of diffusion, is the response
by each unit to a common shock (Gilardi 2012, 11). While
response to a common shock is analytically distinct from
diffusion, the two are often intertwined in practice: changes
in airport security after 9/11 resulted from a heightened
awareness of terrorist threats because of the attack itself,
but the procedures adopted were simultaneously informed
by the measures of earlier adopters. In the case of NGO
restriction legislation, an obvious “common shock” to con-
sider is the growth in NGOs in the 1990s. But as we will
show below, NGO growth is in fact negatively correlated to
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sought elsewhere. In international relations and compara-
tive politics, a categorization of diffusion mechanisms into
four types has become current (Simmons, Dobbin, and Gar-
rett 2008; Gilardi 2012): coercion, competition, learning,
and emulation. Coercion does not provide a particularly
plausible explanation here. The emerging “autocracy pro-
motion” literature has shown that authoritarian regimes
have no vested interested in, and are not observed using,
antiliberal conditionality (Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner
2010: 88–91 Vanderhill 2013, 6; Tansey 2016, 144). Nor is
competition relevant: states do not compete in who can
make life most difficult for NGOs. Learning and emulation
are of interest as diffusion mechanisms for NGO restriction
legislation. Learning is defined by Gilardi (2012) as “the
process whereby policy-makers use the experience of other
countries to estimate the likely consequences of policy
change.” We interpret the “experiences of other countries”
broadly, including not only adoption or nonadoption of
specific laws, but also political developments that do not
emanate from government, but on the contrary, threaten it.
Emulation means that policies diffuse “because of their nor-
mative and socially constructed properties instead of their
objective characteristics” (Gilardi 2012). It follows a logic of
appropriateness rather than a logic of consequences. How-
ever, as acknowledged by Simmons et al. (2008, 795, 800)
and insisted on by many constructivists, self-interested and
ideational motivations are not always distinguishable in the
context of social learning. As we will argue below, making
a distinction between a logic of appropriateness and a logic
of consequences is not particularly meaningful in our case
of illiberal norm diffusion, where rational and ideational
learning would point toward the same outcome. In this
study therefore, we will refer broadly to learning to com-
prise both pragmatic and normatively inspired responses to
developments in other states, as the relevant “mechanism”
(Simmons et al. 2008; Gilardi 2012) of diffusion in the
context of NGO restriction legislation.
Restricting NGOs: Incentives and Barriers
Three existing studies on the relationship between NGO re-
strictions and foreign aid (Christensen and Weinstein 2013;
Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016) provide valuable clues
as to the trade-offs governments may make in relation to
such restrictions; it is a balancing act between the domestic
desirability of curtailing potentially oppositional civil-society
voices in order to stay in power and the international
reputational and economic costs of such restrictions. Both
Christensen and Weinstein (2013) and Dupuy and Prakash
(2018) find that NGO restrictions do indeed come at a cost:
they are associated with subsequent drops in bilateral aid.
Discussing under what circumstances states might nonethe-
less choose to adopt such restrictions, Christensen and
Weinstein (2013, 79) posit that “vulnerable governments
restrict civil society in hopes of weakening groups that might
mobilize opposition. Worries about international retaliation
can, however, restrain such governments if they come to fear
that clamping down will cost them more than it is worth.”
In the third study, Dupuy et al. (2016) consider the reverse
causal relation: whether foreign aid dependence would limit
restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs. They characterize
restrictions by aid-dependent states as “puzzling; restrictive
governments are risking their international reputations by
provoking local and international NGO protest and are
voluntarily foregoing valuable resources” (Dupuy et al.
2016, 300). They find that (only) when aid dependence
is combined with competitive elections, NGO restrictions
have an increased probability of being adopted. Hence
they conclude that “[w]hen governments’ political survival
appears threatened . . . reducing political risk through
restrictive NGOs finance laws outweighs the attendant
economic and reputational costs” (Dupuy et al. 2016, 306).
By considering restrictions only in aid-dependent states,
these studies could be overemphasizing the cost of restrict-
ing NGOs. The oil-rich states of the Middle East and Cen-
tral Asia or middle-income states such as Malaysia, Mexico,
or Turkey may not face immediate financial consequences
from restrictions. Nonetheless, restricting NGOs, which vio-
lates the human right to freedom of association, may carry a
reputational cost, causing embarrassment and having poten-
tial knock-on effects for diplomatic relations, trade agree-
ments, or arms deals, even for states that are not dependent
on foreign aid.
In their version of the balancing act between the desirabil-
ity of curtailing NGOs and the international reputational
cost of doing so, these existing NGO restriction studies miss
two things. First, they assume that governments look solely
to their domestic environment when assessing whether their
incumbency is vulnerable. Second, they assume that the rep-
utational costs of restricting NGOs are given. We look to the
literature on authoritarian learning and to the literature on
liberal norm diffusion to challenge both assumptions. Build-
ing on these literatures, we suggest that, instead, calcula-
tions about the vulnerability of government and about the
reputational cost of restricting NGOs are both made in a
dynamic international context. Governments scan their en-
vironment, and particularly their immediate neighborhood,
to learn how to weigh up utility for stability against reputa-
tional risk, when deciding whether or how to restrict NGOs.
Authoritarian Learning
In the wake of the color revolutions in Eurasia and the
Arab revolts, it became clear that threats to the stability of
authoritarian governments do not just emerge domestically
and that governments are aware of and respond to insta-
bility in their neighborhood. A literature on “authoritarian
learning” has emerged, which focuses not on a switch or
slide from a democratic into an authoritarian mode of gov-
ernance, but on the measures authoritarian regimes take
in order to try to remain stable (Heydemann and Leenders
2011; Finkel and Brudny 2012; Koesel and Bunce 2013;
Bank and Edel 2015). The primary focus has been on a very
particular type of learning, which receives almost no atten-
tion in the policy diffusion literature but is common in con-
flict studies (for the seminal contribution, see Buhaug and
Gleditsch 2008; see also Danneman and Hencken Ritter
2014; Böhmelt, Ruggeri, and Pilster 2017): learning from
threats. The authoritarian learning literature has been
mainly qualitative and primarily focused on the post-Soviet
and Middle East regions. Both regions experienced transna-
tional “waves” of protest in which protestors were clearly
inspired by examples in neighboring countries to take to
the streets themselves; witnessing these events, government
officials had good reason to preemptively counteract such
behavior.
In the post-Soviet sphere, Finkel and Brudny have ar-
gued that the so-called color revolutions in Serbia, Geor-
gia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine “created an acute feeling
of threat among authoritarian elites, which led them to
adopt policies designed to prevent the possibility of a
color revolution in their respective countries” (2012, 7).
Their discussion prominently features NGO restrictions
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Brudny and Finkel 2012, 16–17, on Russia; Radnitz 2012,
69, on Azerbaijan; Markowitz 2012, 109–10, on Tajikistan).
In relation to the Arab revolts too, Heydemann and Leen-
ders already noted in late 2011 that a “top-down process of
authoritarian learning and adaptation is currently visible
in the way authoritarian incumbents in Algeria, Morocco,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria . . . developed
strategies . . . to maximize their probabilities of surviving.”
A more detailed study by Bank and Edel (2015) has docu-
mented learning from threats by Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan,
and Syria, regarding material incentives, repression, and
legal reform (see also Yom 2014). Koesel and Bunce (2013),
finally, have suggested that major powers China and Russia
have been “diffusion-proofing” themselves in response to
both the color revolutions and the Arab revolts. Although
a few authors hypothesize authoritarian learning as tak-
ing place within an “authoritarian epistemic community”
(Heydemann 2009, 32; Yom 2014), research to date has
centered on strategic responses to immediate threats, rather
than the possibility of norm-diffusion via socialization.
Illiberal Norm Diffusion Through Learning from Threats
The literature on authoritarian governments pictures them
as concerned with their survival and trying to improve their
chances, in an environment of lurking domestic threats:
quelling coup-attempts, fighting rebellions, and repressing
protests if they can. To a large extent, the argument can
also be applied to hybrid regimes and even democracies,
the main difference being a greater level of restraint in the
means incumbents will use to stay in power and their ulti-
mate preparedness to depart in the face of unfavorable elec-
toral results. Regardless of regime type, we may expect gov-
ernments to also look beyond their domestic environment
to understand and respond to what might be a threat, if not
today, then tomorrow. The literature confirms these intu-
itions: it finds incumbents responding to top-down threats
(i.e., coups and assassinations, Böhmelt et al. 2017); to vi-
olent bottom-up threats (i.e., insurgencies, Danneman and
Hencken Ritter 2014), and to nonviolent bottom-up threats
(i.e., mass protests, Koesel and Bunce 2013; Bank and Edel
2015) abroad with relevant preemptive countermeasures.
We posit that learning from threats in the international
environment is primarily an intraregional phenomenon.
Weyland writes about the diffusion of revolutions that
“neighborhood effects were strong, given that geographic
proximity makes information available. News travels easily
among adjacent states, which often have historical and per-
sonal ties. This holds especially true where commonality or
similarity of language prevails” (Weyland 2009, 410). Just
like the revolutionaries themselves, policy-makers who aim
to prevent political instability do not dispassionately scan
threats all over the world: they rely on “cognitive heuristics”
(Weyland 2009, 393) stemming from the information that is
most readily available and most vivid to them. At the same
time, as Weyland explains, this alertness to information from
the international environment does not mechanically de-
cay with each kilometer; it happens in the minds of peo-
ple and is therefore mediated by shared history, linguistic
proximity, cultural similarities, personal ties, ease of travel,
and regional organizational infrastructure, all of which are
most dense within regions and among neighboring states.
What is perhaps less obvious is why such preemption should
be concerned with NGOs. Coups and assassinations are not
plausibly connected with NGOs, nor is a connection with
armed rebellions particularly likely. Bottom-up threats in
the form of mass mobilization, emanating as they do from
the realm of civil society, are the kind of hazard most likely
to be associated with NGOs. The literature on civil society
and democracy assistance has been very critical of the belief
that the presence of NGOs in a country, foreign-funded or
otherwise, necessarily has a democratizing or even destabi-
lizing effect (Ishkanian 2008; Jalali 2013; Lewis 2013). NGOs
are not necessarily government critics; they may be apolit-
ical charity organizations, pragmatic rent-seekers, or ideo-
logically aligned with the government. But while NGOs are
not likely to cause protests in and of themselves, they can
be incubators of intellectual challenges to the government,
lend powerful infrastructural support to protest movements
(Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Glasius and Ishkanian 2015),
or monitor and report on protest events and associated
repression.
Moreover, a government would not necessarily need
strong proof that NGOs in general are associated with
protest movements to take restrictive measures. The mea-
sures might be intended to target just a few NGOs, perhaps
with an explicit human rights or democratization agenda, or
concerned with explosive issues such as corruption or pol-
lution, while leaving others unaffected. As we will describe
below, a panoply of possible measures ostensibly “regulat-
ing” either all NGOs, or more specifically foreign-funded
NGOs, lends itself to such selective application. If threats
are the primary mechanism driving adoption of NGO re-
strictions, different types of restrictive measures could serve
the purposes of the government equally well, so we would
not expect to see any specific preferences for certain types
of restrictions. For instance, making it easy to suspend the
registration of an NGO can serve the same purpose as insist-
ing that NGOs require separate licenses for “political” activ-
ities. Both measures give governments a fine-grained instru-
ment for monitoring NGOs closely and intervening when
they are deemed to be a nuisance. Or in an environment
where foreign-funded NGOs are perceived as particularly
threatening, onerous requirements for registering a foreign-
funded organization (such as Russia’s “foreign agent” law)
can serve the same purpose as restrictions on the funding
itself. At the same time, a stronger perceived threat should
provoke a stronger response (i.e., more restrictions, for in-
stance, making it easy to suspend NGOs and cutting off their
funding). We would therefore expect to see a general pat-
tern of more NGO restrictions in the period following a gov-
ernment’s perceived heightened level of bottom-up threats
in its regional environment.
H1: The more states observe nonarmed bottom-up threats in their
regional environment, the more NGO restrictions they will adopt.
Liberal Norm Diffusion
Having established why governments might look to their
regional environment to establish whether they are facing
risks that could be offset by restricting NGOs, we now
turn to the other side of the balance they must strike:
the potential reputational risk. The literature on liberal
norm diffusion teaches us that governmental perceptions
of reputational risks and benefits of particular policies
are not constant. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s classic study
on the diffusion of human rights norms posit that these
norms are internalized and implemented through social-
ization (1999, 5). They insist that “norms become relevant
and causally consequential during the process by which
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While Risse et al. emphasize the social construction of le-
gitimacy, subsequent studies in the field of human rights
have come to the more cynical conclusion that states ratify
human rights treaties only for reputational benefit, without
actual improvement in human rights behavior (Hathaway
2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Vreeland 2008; see
Greenhill 2010 for a rare exception). Regardless whether it
is strategic learning on reputational benefits or deep learn-
ing on appropriateness, or indeed a mix of both, there is
much evidence for liberal norm diffusion through learn-
ing from previous adoptions. States continually define and
refine their understandings of appropriateness and state
interest and look to their international environment as
well as to their domestic circumstances to help them make
these judgments. Despite the occasional acknowledgement
that antiliberal norms can in principle be diffused in very
similar ways, the literature almost universally focuses on
the—rather heterogeneous—bundle of norms commonly
referred to as “liberal,” including trade liberalization, de-
mocratization, and human rights norms. But the theory can
lend itself to explaining diffusion of illiberal norms.
Illiberal Norm Diffusion: Learning from Examples
The liberal norm diffusion literature would suggest that
governments adopt NGO restriction legislation not because
they are directly feeling threatened, but because they see
others do so and they think it is appropriate for them. When
it comes to the adoption of illiberal norms, a purely rep-
utational advantage such as that gained from ratifying hu-
man rights treaties does not make much sense; major powers
such as China or Russia do not promote and reward illiberal
norm adoption in the same way that the West was promot-
ing liberal norms in the 1990s. But it does make sense that
governments would find comfort in the adoption of NGO
restrictions by other states, and as they see others adopt re-
strictions, they come increasingly to believe that it is now
legitimate to do so.
While much of the liberal norm diffusion literature dates
from a period when both theory and methods were less geo-
graphically discriminate, we take inspiration from Simmons,
who has shown that “the region in which a country is situ-
ated” constitutes the “crucial reference group” when decid-
ing whether to ratify human rights treaties (Simmons 2009,
90). Likewise, we assume that learning from examples, like
learning from threats, is intraregional for reasons that are
bound up with shared history, linguistic or cultural similar-
ities, ease of travel, and personal ties. Moreover, “a multi-
plicity of overlapping regional associations” will “facilitate
intensely shared common knowledge” (Simmons 2009, 90)
between policy-makers.
H2.1: The more states observe adoption of NGO restrictions in their
regional environment, the more NGO restrictions they will adopt.
We further argue that governments look to their regional
environment, not just to decide whether to restrict NGOs, but
also for inspiration as to what legislative measures to take. If
diffusion of NGO restriction legislation is indeed driven by
imitation, we should expect more specific patterns of adop-
tion: later adopters will be looking to the laws of other states
and could be adopting the same types of restrictions these
states adopted before.
H2.2: The more states observe adoption of NGO restrictions of a
certain type in their regional environment, the more likely they are to
subsequently adopt the same type of NGO restrictions.
Data and Patterns of Adoption
Before embarking on our analysis, we will provide further
details on our coding and describe the patterns of diffusion
we observe over time, by regime type, by restriction type, and
by region. Our data focuses purely on legislative measures. It
differs in this respect from other indices of civic space such
as the V-Dem project or CIVICUS, which conflate observa-
tions of legislative developments with data on legal harass-
ment and material sanctions against specific NGOs and le-
gal or physical harassment of individual activists. Our focus
on legislation alone makes it possible to infer whether we
are witnessing an overt shift in normative orientation: gov-
ernments may deny responsibility for the behavior of state
agents, or even deny the facts, to avoid reputational dam-
age. Laws by contrast are adopted formally and publicly.
At the outset of this article, we claimed that NGO restric-
tion legislation has experienced a steep rise since the early
2000s. Our claim is based on our amended and expanded
version of the database reported on in Christensen and
Weinstein (2013), which documents legislative restrictions
on NGOs up until 2012. Since early data are sparse, we begin
our database in 1992 but have added four more years: 2013–
2016. The original data were used for a cross-sectional anal-
ysis but did typically list the year in which a restriction was
adopted. Based on this, for each type of restriction, we have
coded adoption as 1 for the year in which the restriction was
enacted and all years afterward that it was in effect for the
period 1992–2016 and 0 otherwise.1 In case the adoption
year was unspecified we have either found it through other
sources or chosen to code it 0 in order to consistently
under- rather than overestimate our dependent variable.
We have dropped some of the legislative measures dis-
cerned by Christensen and Weinstein: constitutional provi-
sions because they rarely change and have limited practi-
cal impact (Measures 1a and 1b in the original data); the
obligation to register an NGO and the obligation to disclose
funding sources, because they certainly regulate, but in our
view do not necessarily restrict the operation of NGOs (Mea-
sures 2a and 3a, respectively); and instances of intimidation,
because they are not legislative measures (Measure 4b). We
have turned all remaining measures into binary variables, as
shown in Table 1.
The data are based on reports from four sources: the In-
ternational Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), USAID’s
NGO Sustainability Index, the World Movement for Democ-
racy (WMD), and the Global Integrity reports. The database
contains ninety-six states. Since our sources are mostly advo-
cacy reports, it is likely biased toward states that have indeed
enacted restrictive legislation. Hence, the database does not
lend itself to making pronouncements about absolute levels
of diffusion worldwide. But it does help us to better under-
stand what drives adoption of NGO restrictions.
A few further caveats are in order. First, we have counted
specific legislative measures, not laws. The Civil Society Or-
ganizations Act of Bhutan (2007) for instance was coded as
incorporating four different restrictions: placing undue bur-
dens on NGO registration in general (2b); placing specific
restrictions on registration of foreign-funded NGOs (2d);
making channeling of foreign funding through a govern-
ment agency mandatory (3c), and placing further restric-
tions on foreign support (3d) by prohibiting the merger of
domestic and foreign organizations.
Also, we have only counted restrictions when we have
definitive evidence that they were not just proposed by
1 For a list of countries included and a detailed description of our changes to
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Table 1. Coding of NGO restriction measures
Category Code Type of Measure
2 Barriers to entry 2b Burdensome registration
2c No appeal against denied registration
2d Special restrictions on registration of foreign-funded NGOs
3 Barriers to resources 3b Prior government approval required for foreign funding
3c Foreign funding must be channeled through government
3d Restrictions on foreign support other than funding
3e Prohibition on all foreign funding
3f Prohibition on foreign funding to certain type(s) of NGOs
4 Barriers to advocacy 4a Restrictions on NGOs engaging in political activities
4c Special restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs engaging in political activities
4d Prohibition on NGOs engaging in political activities
Notes: AUTHORS, adapted from Christensen and Weinstein (2013).
government, or discussed in parliament, but actually
adopted.2 Draft laws may sometimes already affect adoption
by other states, a dynamic our database does not capture,
but which we encounter in our qualitative analysis. A final
source of underreporting lies in the fact that our catego-
rization does not always catch every additional restriction;
if for instance a law requiring governmental permission for
any foreign funding above $500,000 was superseded by a
law requiring permission for all foreign funding, we would
code the first law as a restriction on foreign funding, but
the further restriction would not alter the coding.
As can be discerned from Figure 1, restrictions against
NGOs were relatively rare, and rose only slightly, for most
of the 1990s. From 1997 onward, the number begins to rise
considerably every year and continues to rise during the
2000s as the total growth in the number of NGOs begins
to level off.
In order to understand what kinds of states restrict NGOs,
we divided them into democracies, autocracies, and “anoc-
racies,” or hybrid regimes, according to the Polity IV catego-
rization (Marshall and Gurr 2014). Figure 2 shows that there
has been at least a fourfold increase in NGO restrictions in
states that are not fully democratic, between 1992 and 2016.
Differences in growth rates between autocracies and hybrid
regimes are small, in line with our argument that restriction
of NGOs is an illiberal, but not only or even primarily au-
thoritarian phenomenon.
Adoptions of restrictions by democracies in our database
have also increased, from an average of 0.47 to 1.47. Bolivia
and more recently India have adopted a number of restric-
tions against NGOs; Mexico and South Africa have made
registration burdensome; and the United States—while be-
ing a major provider of aid to foreign NGOs itself—places
special restrictions on the registration of NGOs that receive
foreign funding. As mentioned above, democratic states that
never adopted any restrictions on NGOs are not picked up
in our source material and hence not included in our data.
Figure 3 shows that states have adopted a wide array of
different types of NGO restrictions. The most common
type is making registration burdensome (2b) by making
the requirements for getting registration vague and/or
onerous. Azerbaijan’s NGO Law of 2009, for example,
requires NGOs to register with the Ministry of Justice within
thirty days after their formation, but does not specify a time
limit by which the Ministry must process the registration,
2 Since NGO restriction legislation typically attracts most media attention
when it is first proposed, it was sometimes difficult to ascertain when exactly a law
was adopted. Our data matches the more limited dataset by Dupuy et al. (2016),
which counts thirty-nine restrictive laws, in terms of the nature of the restrictions,
but the time of adoption sometimes diverged by one year.
giving it leeway for de facto refusal of registration by means
of inaction (Ramazanova and Others vs. Azerbaijan, ECtHR,
as described in ICNL 2009, 13–14). Similar measures were
adopted by 61 percent of the states in our dataset. This fits
with our intuition that reputational cost is the main barrier
to adoption: burdensome registration requirements are
a flexible way of making it difficult for NGOs to operate
under cover of bureaucratic procedure, rather than openly
exerting political repression.
When it comes to checking foreign influence, special
restrictions on the registration of NGOs that receive foreign
funding (2d) are most prevalent. They have been adopted
by half our states. Thus, foreign-funded NGOs can be
prevented from functioning at all. We will describe exactly
what some of these provisions look like in our qualitative
analysis below. Another frequent measure directed against
foreign funding is the requirement of prior government
approval (3b). This even more targeted measure allows a
government to make a case-by-case assessment of whether
foreign funding is on the whole beneficial or threatening to
it. “Additional restrictions” (3d), rather like “burdensome
registration,” covers a range of seemingly bureaucratic
requirements that can make foreign funding difficult with-
out prohibiting it outright. Another measure that gives
a government full control over foreign funding without
seemingly being overtly repressive is the requirement that
the money be channeled through a government institution
or state-owned bank (3c). Still relatively rare, this kind of
measure has gained traction in recent years. A much smaller
group of states has taken measures more explicitly to restrict
(4a) or even prohibit (4d) political activities by NGOs. This
measure has been resorted to more frequently in the Arab
world after 2011, covering all NGOs, whereas African states
have been more prone to restricting political activities by
international NGOs only. We use three of the eleven distinct
subtypes for our regression analyses, as described below.
Finally, before embarking on our analysis, it is worth consid-
ering the regional spread of NGO restriction legislation.
Figure 4 suggests, first of all, that unlike “liberal norms,”
NGO restrictions have not originated in one region and
diffused from there. In each region there are a few early
adopters, followed by a gradual increase over time. They
include Bangladesh and Nepal in Asia, Bolivia in Latin
America, and, a little later, Belarus and Turkmenistan in
the post-Soviet region. The BRIC powers are notably later
adopters. Although the different regions follow a similar
pattern of increasing restrictions, the curve is steepest for
Asian (n = 19) and Middle East and North African (MENA,
n = 19) countries. The European countries in our dataset
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Figure 2. Average number of restrictions per country, by regime type
The descriptive data tell us that there clearly is diffusion,
that it is not only or even mostly an autocratic phenomenon,
that it does not appear to be a direct response to NGO
growth, and that it is not driven by major powers, discarding
a number of alternative explanations to our theory. They do
not tell us whether NGO restriction does indeed occur as a
response to threats elsewhere or in imitation of regional ex-
amples, or both. In our next section we will discuss the meth-
ods we employ for testing our hypotheses and our quantita-
tive findings.
Quantitative Analysis: Methods & Findings
Learning from Threats: Data And Methods
Our first hypothesis states that states “learn from threats”
(i.e., the more they observe nonarmed bottom-up threats in
their regional environment, the more NGO restrictions they
will adopt). The basis of our measure of nonarmed bottom-
up threats, regional mass mobilization, is the log of the total
number of participants in the largest demonstration in a
country in a given year, obtained from the Mass Mobiliza-
tion Protest Data (see Clark and Regan 2016). These data
allow us to quantify the threat emanating from nonarmed
protests in an intuitive manner. As we explained above,
NGOs are not likely to be associated with coups or insur-
gencies, but they may provide vital organizational support
to street protestors or report on their presence.
Scholars use a broad variety of criteria to determine how
distance is expected to affect influence, depending on what
it is they are measuring. For our analyses, we employ two
distance-based measures. First, we employ a substantively
intuitive regional classification measure. This is computed
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Figure 4. Average number of restrictions per country, by region3
regions presented in Figure 4,3 excluding the focal country.
This classification privileges historic, linguistic, and cultural
similarities over pure proximity. Thus, it would recognize
that Morocco is more likely to be an example to Jordan
(Bank and Edel 2015, 12) than to neighboring Spain or
that Armenia may be more likely to look to developments
in Russia than to neighboring Turkey or Iran.
3 For our regional classifications, see Supplementary Materials.
Second, we relax the assumption that diffusion only hap-
pens within the rigid boundaries of these historically and
culturally determined regions and define the region based
on pure proximity. This intuition is borne out by one of our
qualitative examples below, where a legislative restriction
from Egypt in the MENA region is copied by sub-Saharan
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Likewise, one could hypoth-
esize learning via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
between states classified either as part of the “post-Soviet re-
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We operationalize this by means of a distance-weighted
measure, such as often employed in diffusion stud-
ies, though they differ in the way they apply weights.
For example, Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) use exact min-
imum distances in kilometers between borders up to 950
km, while Gleditsch and Ward (2001) use 950 km as a cutoff
point to classify a state as a “neighbor,” and Danneman and
Hencken Ritter (2014) use a variety of distance-based mea-
sures in addition to a 950 km cutoff point. On the other end
of the spectrum, Bell, Bhasin, and Clay, et al. (2014) use a 50
km cutoff point to classify a state as a neighbor. Here, we fol-
low the 950 km minimum distance between state borders as
cutoff criterion; this relatively expansive measure of distance
is appropriate for measuring the diffusion of ideas rather
than physical spillovers across borders. Thus, we first create
a row-standardized connectivity matrix W, which is used to
weight the mass mobilization variable, given as




where cij equals 1 if the minimum distance between states
i and j is less than 950 km and 0 otherwise. To determine
the minimum distance between country borders, we use the
“cshapes” package in R (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch
2010), which also allows us to take into account changes in
country borders.
These two distinct measures of spatial influence are used
for all spatially weighted variables in our analyses. We do
not use kilometer-based minimum distance weights—where
influence decays as distance increases between borders—
because we do not find it intuitive that the receptiveness of
policy-makers to foreign ideas would mechanically decrease
with each kilometer in the way that the mobility of physical
objects might decline.
Our dependent variable for Hypotheses 1 and 2.1 is a
count of the eleven types of restrictions against NGOs. While
it is difficult to estimate, on average, how long it would take
a state to adopt NGO restriction legislation in response to a
perceived threat, we have introduced a time lag of one year
for our spatially weighted variables, as is common in similar
studies (Koo and Ramirez 2009; Dupuy et al. 2016).
There are several domestic and regional phenomena that
we might expect to explain adoption behavior, while also be-
ing associated with nonarmed threats. The first variable we
control for is NGO growth or the percentage growth in the
number of NGOs within a focal country in a given year. We
have taken the annual number of NGOs per country from
the Union of International Associations (2015/2016).We al-
ready know from Figure 1 that at the aggregate level, the
growth levels off by the end of the 1990s and cannot in it-
self explain the diffusion of restrictions, but in some individ-
ual countries restriction legislation may correspond much
more closely to growth, hence we need to control for it.
A few outliers (20 out of 2,302 country-year observations)
have a growth percentage larger than 100 percent, skewing
this variable. Rather than taking the log of NGO growth (cf.
Dupuy et al. 2016), we truncate the growth for these twenty
country-year combinations at 100 percent. Second, if we ex-
pect mass protests in other states to lead a government to
restrict NGOs, than this should a fortiori be the case for do-
mestic mass protest. Thus, we also include a mass mobilization
variable indicating the log of the total number of partici-
pants in domestic protests within a focal country-year, with a
one-year lag. Third, to rule out results driven by autocratic
regimes alone, we control for regime type. The variable au-
tocratic is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a state
is classified as an autocracy in a given year, based on the
Polity IV categorization. Our fourth and fifth control vari-
ables are both spatially lagged variables representing more
violent or disruptive bottom-up threats. The variable regional
riots, from Banks and Wilson’s (2019) data, captures any vio-
lent demonstration or clash of more than one hundred cit-
izens involving the use of physical force, with “regional” de-
fined by our two spatial measures, as described above. The
variable regional strikes captures the presence of any strike
of one thousand or more workers involving more than one
employer and aimed at the government (Banks and Wilson
2019), with “regional” defined as above. Finally, we also con-
trol for regional NGO restrictions, the key variable to test in
Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2. (see below).
Following similar models on diffusion of policy that use
count-dependent variables (Prakash and Potoski 2006; De
Ruiter and Schalk 2017), we use a pooled negative binomial
event-count model to test Hypothesis 1. The motivation for
this choice is that the counts of NGO restriction types have a
lower bound of zero, with a substantial number of country-
year observations with a zero count, as well a standard devi-
ation for restrictions, which is larger than the mean, and
overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). In addition,
because we have time series and thus multiple observations
for each state, country-year observations are not indepen-
dent. We use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
within states to account for this. Finally, we also include fixed
effects for the different years in the dataset, to account for
unobserved temporal effects, such as the impact of specific
events or significant changes in sociopolitical and economic
conditions that could trigger NGO restriction legislation.
Learning from Examples: Data and Method
Our second hypothesis states that states learn whether to
restrict, but also how to restrict NGOs “from examples”
(i.e., by studying, and where useful copying, the laws re-
cently adopted by regional exemplars). Various observa-
tions from our descriptive data lend support to this idea.
First, it fits with the types of restrictions we see most often
(see Figure 3). If threats were driving restrictions, we might
expect to see the most draconic or most overtly political
measures used most often. Instead, a blanket prohibition
on political activities is unusual (15 percent of adoptions)
and a blanket prohibition on foreign funding even more so
(6 percent). Moreover, the fact that NGO restrictions have
risen as much in hybrid as in fully authoritarian regimes,
and have even gone up in full democracies, strengthens the
notion that we may be witnessing a gradual shift in what is
globally considered legitimate in terms of limiting freedom
of association.
Many of the restrictions in our database are functional
equivalents of each other from a repressive point of view,
which led us to consider any restrictions as dependent vari-
able for our learning from threats hypothesis. If we are
witnessing learning from examples, states may be learning
not only that it is less risky to restrict NGOs, making them
more likely to adopt more restrictions (Hypothesis 2.1), but
also more likely to study previously adopted laws and subse-
quently adopt the same type of NGO restrictions in their own
legislation (Hypothesis 2.2).
Hence, our independent variable for Hypothesis 2.2 is
the previous adoption of particular NGO restrictions by
other regional states, and the dependent variable is the
subsequent adoption of the same type of legislation. Not all
of our eleven type measures lend themselves equally well to
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (pooled; 1992–2016)
Variable n Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Number of NGO restrictions 2400 1.69 1.87 0 7
Restriction: registration barriers foreign-funded NGOs 2400 0.31 0.46 0 1
Restriction: government approval foreign funding 2400 0.17 0.38 0 1
Restriction: foreign-funded political activities 2400 0.12 0.33 0 1
Autocracy (ref = democratic and anocratic) 2400 0.24 0.43 0 1
NGO growth 2303 4.34 12.22 −97.88 100
Mass mobilization 2134 39,669.8 23,3970.8 0 7000,000
Domestic strikes 2400 0.11 0.59 0 11
Domestic riots 2400 0.73 2.29 0 28
actually covers a wide array of measures, and the same is true
for “restrictions on foreign support other than funding”
(3d). We therefore focus on three measures, one in each
category, that are distinctive, clearly differentiated from
each other, and that occur frequently enough for a mean-
ingful analysis. They are “special restrictions on the regis-
tration of foreign-funded NGOs” (2d); “prior government
approval required for foreign funding” (3b), and “special
restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs engaging in political
activities” (4c). We use the same control variables and time
and spatial lags as in the learning-from-threats model. In
addition, we control for regional mass mobilization, the key
variable to test Hypothesis 1.
The structure of the data to test Hypothesis 2.2 is different
from the structure of the data to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.1.
Rather than the total number of adoption types, we are in-
terested here in the adoption of a specific restriction. A key
observation for the three types of restrictions in our data is
that, once a restriction is adopted, it is hardly ever revoked
(although this is a theoretical possibility).4
Thus, the data can be interpreted as “time-to-event” data,
suggesting survival analysis as the appropriate technique
(Allison 1984). That is, we consider each country to be “at
risk” of adoption for the period 1992–2016, while the de-
pendent variable is the hazard rate, understood here as the
rate of adoption of a certain restriction type by a given state,
or the odds of adoption given that state is still at risk. A state
is right-censored if in 2016 it had not (yet) adopted the re-
striction type. We follow earlier work on legislative adoption
rates in the field of human rights (Cole 2015; Wotipka and
Ramirez 2008; Koo and Ramirez 2009) and employ an expo-
nential survival distribution, where the hazards are assumed
to be constant over time and dependent on the vector of
(time-varying) covariates in the model.
Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of
the variables used in the analyses. NGO growth obviously has
no values for 1992. Also, Israel and the United States have
missing values on the mass mobilization variable, as well as
some other country-year observations, reducing the effec-
tive number of observations in the analyses. The pooled and
the within-year correlations between the covariates gave no
concerns for multicollinearity issues. Table 2 shows that, on
average, countries have only adopted 1.69 restriction types
over the period of observation and a maximum of seven out
of eleven possible. Of the 2400 country-year observations,
24 percent is autocratic. This is not to say that 24 percent
of states is autocratic, as states can switch regime type over
4 This only happens for restriction (3b), which Qatar adopted then revoked
and Jordan adopted, revoked, and adopted again. Because these instances consti-
tute such as small fraction of the total sample, we regard the data as single-event
survival data.
the period of observation (which happened at least once for
thirty-five states in our dataset).
Findings
Our findings for both hypotheses can be found in Table 3
and Table 4. Table 3 presents the negative binomial anal-
ysis testing Hypotheses 1 and 2.1, while Table 4 presents
the survival analysis testing Hypothesis 2.2. In both tables,
we present four models: a model only including the key
independent variables to test the hypotheses and a full
model including all control variables, while each is fitted
using (1) the regional classification spatial weights for all
spatially weighted variables in the model and (2) the 950
km distance-based spatial weights.
Our first hypothesis is that, when nonarmed bottom-
up threats in their regional environment are higher, states
are expected to adopt more NGO restrictions. Looking
at Table 3, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 must be rejected;
the lagged effect of regional mass mobilization is not signif-
icant in any of the models. Adoption of restrictions against
NGOs is not significantly driven by fear of mass mobiliza-
tions elsewhere spilling over into one’s own territory. A more
disruptive measure of regional bottom-up threats, regional
strikes, does seem to have a positive effect on restrictions
(IRR = 1.33; p < 0.05), but only using the 950 km distance-
based spatial weights. In all, there is only very limited evi-
dence in our data that states learn from threats when re-
stricting NGOs.
By contrast, Table 3 shows strong evidence for Hypoth-
esis 2.1: we see the lagged effect of the spatially weighted
number of restrictions in the region positively affecting the
number of restrictions adopted (irrespective of the specific
type) in all models. This finding is sustained (at p ˂ 0.05)
in an alternative model (not reported in Table 3) without
a cutoff point, where we instead used a decaying minimum
distance weight in kilometers. The incident-rate ratio for au-
tocratic states is 1.73 and 1.59, respectively, meaning that
having an autocratic regime increases the expected count
of restrictions by this factor, holding the other covariates
constant. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, stronger NGO
growth reduces the expected number of restrictions adopted
(IRR = 0.98; p < 0.01).
The findings for Hypothesis 2.2 can be found in Table 4.
According to this hypothesis, states also observe the types
of restrictions being adopted in their regional environment
and become more likely to subsequently adopt the same
type of NGO restrictions. Hence, we must evaluate the
lagged effects of the average adoption percentage in the
region of each of the three restriction types on a coun-
try’s hazard rate of adopting the respective restriction type.
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Table 3. Negative binomial regression of the total number of NGO restrictions, all types (1992–2016)
Regional clustering weighted Minimum distance weighted (<950 km)
Variable IRR (se) IRR (se) IRR (se) IRR (se)
Regional mass mobilization (one-year lag,
weighted, log)
0.99(0.01) 1.00(0.01) 1.02(0.02) 1.02(0.02)
Mass mobilization (within country, one-year
lag, log)
1.00(0.00) 1.00(0.00)
Regional strikes (one-year lag, weighted) 0.84(0.18) 1.33(0.18)**
Regional riots (one-year lag, weighted) 0.92(0.05) 1.05(0.04)
Regional number of NGO restrictions
(one-year lag, weighted)
2.04(0.21)*** 2.00(0.22)*** 1.60(0.19)*** 1.50(0.16)***
Autocratic (ref = democratic and anocratic) 1.59(0.24)*** 1.73(0.29)***
NGO growth 0.98(0.01)*** 0.98(0.01)**
Constant 0.42(0.08)*** 0.50(0.10)*** 0.46(0.12)*** 0.49(0.13)***
n (observations) 2134 2134 2134 2134
n (countries) 89 89 89 89
Wald (df) 199.0(25)*** 290.1(30)*** 151.1(25)*** 223.3(30)***
Notes: (1) Statistical significance levels: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. (2) Standard errors clustered for country, fixed year effects included (not
shown), and incident rate ratios (IRR) reported.
interpreted as the increase in the rate of adoption as a result
of a one-unit increase in the covariate.
Table 4 shows that there is considerable evidence for Hy-
pothesis 2.2: the effect of a regional NGO restriction of a
specific type positively and consistently affects the adoption
rates for registration barriers on foreign-funded NGOs (2b)
using the 950 km distance-based and regional clustering
measures. Adoption of the other two measures, requiring
government approval for foreign funding (3b) and special
restrictions on foreign-funded activities (4c), is affected by
prior regional adoption in at least one full model using ei-
ther type of spatial weight. This clearly suggests that states
do indeed look to their regional environment, not just to
decide whether to restrict NGOs (as Table 3 shows), but
also to decide what kinds of restrictions to adopt. The ef-
fect is strongest for restrictions on activities (4c) and small-
est but still considerable for registration barriers (2d). For
example, using the regional clustering weight, a one-unit
increase in regional NGO adoption—which constitutes a
100 percent increase in the state’s region, since the variable
is coded between 0 and 1—increases the odds of adoption by
13.67 for states still at risk. Given that the average adoption
of registration barriers is 0.31 for all states during the ob-
servation period (see Table 2), this effect can be considered
substantial. Note that countries that had already adopted a
type of restriction in 1992 are excluded from the analysis,
as are right-censored states that had not adopted the restric-
tion by 2016. Both types of exclusion vary by restriction type,
as can be derived from the varying sample sizes in Table 4.
Unlike our finding for Hypothesis 2.1, our findings on
the specific restriction types are not robust in an alterna-
tive model where we used a decaying minimum distance
weight in kilometers. This is in line with our theorization
of how diffusion via learning occurs: it is largely a regional
phenomenon, but does not mechanically decay with each
kilometer.
Learning from Examples: Findings from Textual
Comparisons
Sources and Method
We have robust evidence that states are learning to restrict
from example (Hypothesis 2.1) and considerable evidence
that they are also learning how to restrict (i.e., imitating the
adoption of specific restrictions) (Hypothesis 2.2). But in
order to be confident that the correlations we observed are
indeed a matter of causation, it is necessary to have a closer
look at the actual legal provisions through which NGOs are
restricted. A powerful way of validating our findings for Hy-
pothesis 2.2 would be to see whether we see similarly or iden-
tically worded stipulations travel from one legal jurisdiction
to another.
The most prominent source of information for our data,
the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL),5
maintains an online library of laws that are relevant to civil
society, but many are in local languages only. For two re-
gions, we could access most of the relevant laws in English,
either as official documents or in unofficial translations:
the Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
Within these two regions, thirty-one laws with NGO restric-
tions were adopted by twenty-five states within our research
period. Five laws are not available in English. We read and
analyzed the other twenty-six laws. In six of these, we find no
clear evidence of learning from a foreign example. Within
the remaining twenty laws adopted by fifteen states (see the
supplementary materials for a full list of laws cited), we find
numerous instances of provisions that closely resemble one
other, suggesting learning from examples, with various pos-
sible pathways and permutations. Since space does not allow
us to describe them all, we focus on three “chains of diffu-
sion” within these laws, which we describe chronologically.
In each case, we discuss the similarities between the laws of
the first dyad in detail, making close textual comparisons.
The subsequent instances of diffusion are only briefly men-
tioned, always with reference to the specific article(s) of the
relevant laws. These textual comparisons provide smoking-
gun evidence of learning from examples; the close resem-
blance in language and details demonstrates that the cas-
cade of NGO restrictions cannot simply be attributed to
similar states facing similar challenges and opportunities
and reaching for similar solutions in isolation. Our analyses
do not trace precisely where, when, and how policy-makers
came to know of and decide to adopt elements of previous
legislation. That would be best left to studies devoted to one
5 The full title of each law we cite and the finding place for their English
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particular instance of diffusion of NGO restrictions between
two states.
Gulf Countries: No Affiliation without Prior Permission and No
Foreign Funding
In 1989, Bahrain adopted what was probably its first law reg-
ulating nonprofit entities. According to an ICNL analysis,
elements of the Bahrain law were modeled on a Nasserite
Egyptian law, dating from 1964: “[m]any of these provisions
appear nearly verbatim in subsequently written Arab NGO
laws, such as . . . Bahrain’s Law of Associations . . . adopted
twenty-five years later” (ICNL 2010, 3). While we cannot as-
sess the veracity of this claim, which falls outside the time-
frame of our analysis, we can track the subsequent, slow
movement of three of the Bahraini provisions through the
Gulf region, beginning with Oman, which adopted its Civil
Associations Law only in 2000.
The Bahraini law stipulated that “[n]o association shall
become or join [sic] the membership of any society, club,
or union outside the state of Bahrain without a prior
permission from the specialized administrative authority”
(Bahrain, Decree 21, Art. 20). Oman’s law likewise has it
that associations “shall not participate or join an association,
commission, or club based outside the country without the
prior approval of the Minister” (Oman Law No. 14, 2000,
Art. 5b). Both laws state categorically that “no association
may receive money from a foreigner or a foreign body,”
but domestic associations may send money abroad with
prior official approval. A notable exception to the need
for permission is made in both laws for the sending of
books and leaflets (Bahrain, Decree No. 21, 1989, Art. 20;
Oman, Law No. 14, 2000, Art. 42). The exact configuration
of these provisions, combining a complete prohibition
on receiving foreign money with making affiliating to a
foreign association or sending money abroad subject to
prior governmental permission, and specifically exempting
books and leaflets from such permission, provides strong
evidence that Oman was learning from a foreign example.
This may have been the Bahraini law, or Oman and Bahrain
may both have looked to a common exemplar such as Egypt
or Saudi Arabia, as suggested by ICNL Laws subsequently
adopted by Qatar in 2004 (Law No. 12, Art. 31), by Dubai in
2006 (Resolution No. 12, Art. 5.3 and Art. 12.5), and by the
Federation of the United Arab Emirates in 2008 (Federal
Law No. 2, Art. 17.2 and Art. 43); each contain the same
restrictions and dispensations on (1) affiliating to foreign
associations and on (2) associations receiving money from
or (3) sending it to anyone outside the country.
Egypt to Middle East and East Africa: Double Permissions for
In-Country Activities
From the early 2000s, we see evidence of diffusion of new
types of restrictions in the Middle East, later also mov-
ing into East Africa, this time focusing on restricting the
activities of foreign NGOs directly. The laws adopted by
Yemen (Law No. 1 and its Executive Bylaw, 2001) and Egypt
(Law No. 84 and its Executive Statute, 2002) both describe
the exact same steps that need to be taken for a foreign
organization to get permission to undertake in-country
activities in five consecutive articles. First, the organization
needs to seek permission from the Foreign Ministry (Egypt)
or the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
(Yemen), indicating the legal basis for their activity, the
type of activity, and the budget (Art. 3, Egyptian Execu-
tive Statute; Art. 51, Yemeni Executive Bylaw). Then, that
Ministry sends a description of the proposed activities to
the Ministry of Social Affairs, which is to respond within
fifteen days (Art. 4, Egyptian Executive Statute; Art. 52,
Yemeni Executive Bylaw). If the first Ministry approves of
the application, it enters into an agreement with the foreign
organization within sixty days (Art. 5, Egyptian Executive
Statute; Art. 53, Yemeni Executive Bylaw). The first Ministry
or the foreign organization itself forward the agreement
to the Ministry of Social Affairs (Art. 6, Egyptian Execu-
tive Statute; Art. 54, Yemeni Executive Bylaw). Finally, the
Ministry of Social Affairs gives authorization for the activity
within fifteen days of receiving the agreement (Art. 7, Egyp-
tian Executive Statute; Art. 55, Yemeni Executive Bylaw).
This is not the only set of provisions in the laws adopted
by the two countries that mirror each other. Other examples
are the grounds for dissolution of an NGO (Law No. 84, Art.
42; Yemeni Executive Bylaw, Art. 124), prohibitions against
persons convicted of particular types of crimes founding an
NGO (Egyptian Law No. 84, Art. 2; Yemeni Law No. 1, Art.
5.2), prohibitions against party-political activities (Egyptian
Law No. 84, Art. 11.3; Yemeni Law No. 1, Art.19), the rules
for affiliating to a foreign organization (Egyptian Law No.
84, Art. 16; Yemeni Executive Bylaw, Art. 132), and restric-
tions on the ratio of foreign board members in domestic
NGOs (Egyptian Law No. 84, Art. 32; Yemeni Executive By-
law, Art. 37.1).
These fine-grained similarities indisputably show that one
state has been learning, indeed copying, from the legislation
by the other. The chronology seems to indicate that Egypt,
adopting in 2002, learned from Yemen’s 2001 law. But com-
mon sense would suggest that it is more likely that poorer,
smaller Yemen imitated Egypt instead. Indeed, it turns out
that the Egyptian law was first approved by parliament in
1999, but “declared unconstitutional by the Egyptian Court
of Cassation because of procedural irregularities, but an al-
most identical version was enacted as Law 84 of 2002” (ICNL
2010, 3). Egypt can therefore be considered as the origina-
tor of these provisions.
In the years afterward, similar but less elaborate restric-
tions for foreign NGOs were adopted in the same region, by
Turkey in 2004 (Law No. 5253, Art. 5), by Eritrea in 2005
(Proclamation 145/2005, Arts. 7.4 and 6.1), by Ethiopia in
2005 (New Procedure), and by Sudan in 2006 (Voluntary
and Humanitarian Work [Organization] Act, Art. 9.3). Each
of these provisions conflates registration of foreign NGOs
per se with advance permission for intended activities from
multiple government entities, typically the foreign ministry
or its embassies as well as the domestic ministry in charge of
NGOs. A final, less certain case of diffusion of the “double
permission for in-country activities” may be Iran, which in a
law adopted in 2006 mandates the Ministry of the Interior
and the Foreign Ministry to jointly prepare an executive by-
law specifying permission procedures within three months.
It remains unclear whether such a bylaw was adopted (Iran,
Law on Establishment & Activities of Non-Government Or-
ganisations, 2006, Art. 26).
An African Cycle: Monitoring NGOs through a Regulatory Board
The Ugandan Non-Governmental Organisation Registra-
tion Regulations, promulgated in 2008 (but coming into
force in 2009), set off a cycle of African adoptions of NGO
restrictions focused on domestic NGOs. This law and its
successors are all characterized by the broad powers given
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representatives from various government ministries.
While Uganda already had a National Board for Non-
Governmental Organizations, the new regulation expanded
its powers. Only months later, in February 2009, Ethiopia
adopted a law establishing a Charities and Societies Agency
and describing its powers (Proclamation 621, Art. 4), which
run parallel to those of the Ugandan board in a number
of ways. First, under both laws, NGOs have to apply for
registration with the board or agency (Ugandan Law No.
19, Art. 5, 6; Ethiopian Proclamation 621, Art. 68). Second,
both institutions have broad powers to reject applications:
the Ugandan board only has to “give reasons” for the
rejection; the Ethiopian law allows rejection based on the
likelihood that the NGO will have “purposes prejudicial to
public peace, welfare, or good order in Ethiopia” (Ugan-
dan Law No. 19, Art. 9; Ethiopian Proclamation 621, Art.
69.2). Third, registration only entitles NGOs to temporary,
renewable permits (Ugandan Law No. 19, Art. 7; Ethiopian
Proclamation 621, Art. 76.1). Fourth, both institutions can
revoke these permits once given (Ugandan Law No. 19,
Art. 11; Ethiopian Proclamation 621, Art. 92.2.b). Fifth,
under both laws, NGOs have to submit annual reports of
their activities and annual accounts to the board or agency
(Ugandan Law No. 19, Art. 16a and 16b; Ethiopian Procla-
mation 621, Art. 80.1 and 80.3). Finally, the board or agency
can dissolve an NGO for a number of reasons, including for
Uganda “any other reason the board considers necessary
in the public interest” and for Ethiopia because the organi-
zation’s purposes are deemed “prejudicial to public peace,
welfare, or security” (Ugandan Law No. 19, Art. 17.3.e;
Ethiopian Proclamation 621, Art. 93.1.b and 92.2.b).
Laws establishing government-controlled NGO oversight
bodies were also adopted by Zambia (2009), Rwanda (2011),
and Kenya (2013). Each of these bodies were given broad
powers to reject NGOs registration (Zambia, Law No. 16,
Art. 15a; Rwanda Law No. 4, Art. 20; Kenya, Law No. 18, Art.
16), for instance because its activities are “not in the public
interest” (Zambia, Law No. 16, Art. 15a) or the NGO “in-
tends to jeopardy[z]e security, public order, public health,
morals, or human rights” (Rwanda Law No. 4, Art. 20.2).
They can also suspend or revoke NGO licenses for such rea-
sons (Zambia, Law No. 16, Art. 17; Rwanda Law No. 4, Art.
32 and 33; Kenya, Law No. 18, Art. 18).
Implications
Through tracing specific legal provisions and institutions
from one law to another, these qualitative analyses clearly
confirm our quantitative evidence that states are not just
more likely to adopt restrict laws when other states in the
region have done so, but actually studying the laws of pre-
vious adopters and copying useful elements. They also give
us a more fine-grained understanding of how these diffu-
sion processes actually work, allowing us to draw several ad-
ditional conclusions.
First, no two countries have the exact same NGO restric-
tion laws. We did not find any instances of a wholesale copy-
paste of all or even most of a law. Instead, the laws often ap-
pear to be a bricolage of provisions representing local legal
traditions combined with articles from one or more foreign
exemplars. This is perhaps not surprising, since these laws
do serve domestic purposes; so even if exemplars play an
important role, the laws are always tailored to domestic cir-
cumstances. Second, our qualitative evidence confirms our
quantitative finding that these diffusion processes are heav-
ily geographically determined, moving between countries
that either share a border or are in close proximity to each
other. But our evidence does not privilege any particular
type of connection, linguistic, historic, or infrastructural;
Egypt’s law influenced not only that of Arabic Yemen, but
also East African Ethiopia and Eritrea and perhaps even
Iran. Ethiopia in fact looked both to Egyptian and to Ugan-
dan legislation. The Ugandan law further inspired not only
Kenya and Zambia, but also former French colony Rwanda.
Third, investigation of legal diffusion processes is compli-
cated by two temporal factors. We find that, while two of the
diffusion processes we tracked unfolded relatively rapidly,
within five years, the chain of adoptions we observed in
the Gulf countries took almost twenty years and may have
even earlier origins. Moreover, because of the time that may
elapse between the first publication of a draft law and its
eventual adoption, states may even copy legal provisions be-
fore the original is formally adopted, as suggested by the
example of Yemen. Because our quantitative analysis cannot
capture either these much longer time lapses, or the imi-
tation of draft provisions that had themselves not yet made
it into law, it may actually be underestimating the degree
of learning from examples. More research is needed to un-
derstand precisely what pressures may be causing states to
either delay or speed up adoption of laws inspired in whole
or in part by regional exemplars.
Conclusions
The adoption of legislation that restricts and hinders NGOs
in carrying out their work turns out to be much more a
matter of opportunity than a response to acute threats.
Observable threats in the regional environment are not
a significant driver behind the considerable diffusion of
such measures in recent decades. Instead, we appear to be
witnessing a gradual shifting of the goalposts regarding the
extent to which states believe they can legitimately restrict
freedom of association, driven by learning from examples.
The large number of restrictions we found in 2015 and
2016, as well as many draft laws yet to be adopted, sug-
gests, moreover, that the diffusion of legislative restrictions
against NGOs is ongoing and has far from run its course. As
suggested by recent literature on the quality of democracy
(Abramowitz and Repucci 2018; Luhrmann et al. 2018), the
growing restrictions on freedom of association are part of
a broader trend. But the comparative politics literature on
the quality of democracy within countries remains largely
disconnected from the IR literature on changing power con-
figurations between countries, and neither have so far con-
sidered the role played by diffusion, and more specifically
learning from examples, in explaining the rise in illiberal
policies. While IR scholars debate whether the BRIC pow-
ers have the capacity or the desire to challenge the liberal
world order, our findings suggest a more immanent and
horizontal process of illiberal transformation. In our study, it
was not the rise of illiberal BRIC powers as such that sparked
an illiberal norm cascade, but a gradual change in percep-
tions regarding what constitutes legitimate government in-
terference with freedom of association, and a decrease in as-
sociated reputational risks, based on intraregional learning.
While the rise of illiberal powers or the deteriorating qual-
ity of democracy even in Western states may exert some la-
tent influence, processes of norm diffusion are importantly
also self-reinforcing; perceptions of legitimacy and reputa-
tional risk alter with each adoption. Further research on
other potential processes of illiberal norm diffusion is ur-
gently needed to understand whether learning from exam-
ples is a broader trend and if so whether the trend can be
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laws, broadly interpretable antiterrorist laws, rules restrict-
ing the independence of the judiciary, and restrictive elec-
toral laws are all important candidates for such research.
At the level of civil-society practitioners and policy-
makers, our findings have various implications. First of all,
if governments are copying from each other’s laws, then
civil society should also look at legislation beyond borders,
anticipating examples their governments may consider fol-
lowing. They can identify and perhaps pre-empt adoption
of restrictive provisions, but also uphold and promote best
practice laws in the region. Second, painstaking legal analysis,
experienced as impartial, is required to combat the gradual
shift in governmental perceptions of acceptable restrictions
on freedom of association. From a policy-maker’s, and more
specifically a donor’s, perspective, supporting the work of
the cash-strapped United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Association may be one avenue for doing so.
If governments have been implicitly taught, in recent years,
that restricting NGOs by legislative means is acceptable, it
may yet be possible, through advocacy and diplomacy, to
teach them otherwise.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the International
Studies Quarterly data archive.
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